We study monetary optimal policy in a New Keynesian model at the zero bound interest rate where households use cash alongside house equity borrowing to conduct transactions. The amount of borrowing is limited by a collateral constraint. When either the loan to value ratio declines or house prices fall, we observe a decrease in the money multiplier. We argue that the central bank should respond to the fall in the money multiplier and therefore to the reduction in house prices or the loan to collateral value ratio. We also …nd that optimal monetary policy generates a large and persistent fall in the money multiplier in response to the drop in the loan to collateral value ratio.
Introduction
The recent economic crisis caused a signi…cant decrease in credit availability (Dell Ariccia at al., 2008) which resulted in a sharp fall in house prices and output. Responding to worsening credit conditions, many developed countries signi…cantly expanded their monetary bases. Several central banks engaged in quantitative easing (QE) taking "unconventional" assets onto their balance sheets (Gambacorta at al., 2012) . In this paper, we provide a justi…cation for QE and argue that monetary expansion is necessary for stabilizing price and output ‡uctuations when there is a marked tightening of credit conditions.
The general idea of connecting …nancial markets and business cycles can be traced back to Fisher (1933) , Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) who show that a contraction in the …nancial sector can lead to an economic slowdown. In this paper, we investigate whether, to what extent and how the monetary authorities should respond to worsening …nancial conditions in order to avoid an economic recession.
This question is not new to the academic literature. 1 On the one hand, in his review of recent monetary policy developments, Clarida (2012) argues that …nancial variables are not target variables and should not be included in monetary policy rules. The same opinion is also shared by Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Iacoviello (2005) who claim that the government should not react to changes in asset prices as this does not improve the economy in terms of in ‡ation and output stabilization.
On the other hand, Mishkin (2011) argues that after the 2007-2009 economic crisis, monetary policy makers understood that the …nancial sector has a considerably greater impact on economic activity than has previously been realized. Further to this, Svensson (2009) recognizes that credit capacity and asset prices may have a potentially negative impact on in ‡ation and resource utilization and, therefore, including them in the monetary policy rule is entirely consistent with the stabilization of in ‡ation and output gaps. We will also observe this particular feature in our model.
We study optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian economy with sticky prices where households use cash alongside equity borrowing to conduct transactions. The amount of borrowing is limited by a collateral constraint as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Iacoviello (2005) .
We simply assume that competitive …nancial intermediaries can costlessly create as much credit as they want. However, due to the lack of contract enforcement, each loan has to be collateralized.
We follow Iacoviello (2005) and Midrigan and Philippon (2011) and assume that households use houses as collateral. The households' credit capacity can deteriorate for two reasons: a reduction in collateral value or an exogenous shock which causes a decline in the average recovery rate of collateral. In the remainder of the paper, this is referred to as a "credit shock". When the loan to collateral value (LTV) declines, the credit capacity falls. Less inside money reduces nominal expenditure and, thus, nominal demand. In a ‡exible price economy, producers adjust their prices accordingly and recession is avoided. However, when prices are sticky, only incomplete adjustment is possible, and credit tightening results in both de ‡ation and recession, unless an expansionary monetary policy is implemented.
The principal di¤erence of our model to Iacoviello (2005) , Monacelli (2009) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) is our assumption that the economy may reach a liquidity trap. When the interest rate is at its zero lower bound, the monetary authorities cannot reduce it any further and are hence forced to stimulate the economy by providing direct monetary transfers to households. Unconventional monetary expansion at a zero bound interest rate has been advocated by Friedman (2000 Friedman ( , 2006 and Bernanke at al. (2004) . When the interest rate is at zero bound, direct monetary targeting cannot be criticized in the sense of McCallum (1985) , because it does not cause any volatility in the short-term interest rate. To our knowledge, direct monetary expansion when the interest rate is at its zero lower bound (ZLB) has not been formally modeled and it is not considered in recent academic publications (see Adam and Billi, 2007; Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Wieland, 2012) . The only exception, perhaps, is the recent paper by Benigno and Nistico (2013) , which studies a similar shock to us and gives similar policy recommendations.
We also …nd that monetary policy can ensure perfect stabilization of output and prices when a credit shock hits the economy. When the shock is small, the monetary policy maker can reduce the interest rate. However, a large negative credit shock can drive the interest rate to the ZLB. At that point monetary policy has to inject liquidity into the system.
The expansion of the monetary base in response to the deterioration in credit availability is necessary because of the fall in the money multiplier. The importance of the money multiplier has been discussed in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , Freeman and Kydland (2000) and recently in Goodhart (2009) and Abrams (2011) . Since the money multiplier re ‡ects monetary transmission, optimal monetary policy should respond to changes in it. Our model shows how the multiplier depends on the LTV ratio and the relative price of collateral. Hence, if houses are used as collateral, monetary policy should respond to changes in house prices.
To evaluate monetary policy rules at the ZLB, we construct a second-order approximation as in Benigno and Woodford (2012) 2 and obtain a social loss function as in the conventional New Keynesian model (Benigno and Woodford, 2005 ). In our model, optimal monetary policy generates the same impulse responses to the cost-push shock for output and in ‡ation as in the standard New Keynesian model. In order to achieve optimal dynamics, the social planner should conduct monetary expansion when there is a fall in the LTV ratio or if the relative price of collateral declines.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and de…ne dynamic equations for the economy. In Section 3, we discuss optimal monetary policy and some other policy issues. We include a short discussion of what may happen if the social planner ignores changes in the credit constraint or ‡uctuations in house prices. We also underline the importance of the money multiplier and its connection to credit constraints and the relative price of collateral. In Section 4 we provide a short discussion of the factors which can a¤ect the LTV ratio. In Section 5 we investigate an economy when money and loans are not perfect substitutes. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Model
In this section, we present a stylized New Keynesian economy with collateral constraint. Our model consists of several ingredients. First, we have households who consume …nal goods, provide labor to …nal good producers, earn wages, share the pro…t of the …rms and take loans against collateral. Second, there are intermediate and …nal goods producers. The latter operate in a sticky price environment in the spirit of Calvo (1980) . There are also monetary authorities which make decisions about interest rate and money supply.
Finally, we have a …nancial sector which creates inside money through lending. We simply 2 See also Levine at al. (2008) .
assume that a …nancial intermediary can costlessly create as much loans as is safe. That is a principal di¤erence of our model compared to Benigno and Nistico (2013) assets and recover a …xed proportion of their value. The only interesting outcome of …nancial intermediation for our model is the loan to value ratio. Micro modelling of the …nancial sector could explain/endogenise LTV; however, for simplicity, we treat it as exogenous but stochastic.
Households
A representative household has a utility function that includes the consumption of goods, Y t ;
valuable collateral (house), h t ; and labor, L t ,
where v is the labor supply elasticity parameter, captures individual household preferences towards units of housing and de…nes the value of leisure.
For their transactions, households can use cash, i.e. outside money, M t ; and the money created by the banking system, i.e. inside money, B t . The broad money can be used to buy consumption goods and invest in collateral
where P t is the price of …nal goods, Q t is the price of collateral, and h t h t 1 is investment in collateral.
The amount of private credit is subject to a collateral constraint
which implies that households cannot borrow more than a fraction t of their collateral value 
The loan must be repaid immediately after households obtain their wage and dividend income.
Let W t be the nominal wage and t be the pro…t of …rms owned by households and paid in the form of dividends. Then, at the end of the period, the liquidity position of the household is
Household' s optimization
In the appendix, we show that maximization of household utility (1) subject to constraints (2, 3 and 5) results in the following Euler equation
The left-hand side of the equation shows the marginal bene…t from an extra unit of collateral:
it consists of a direct boost to utility, U 0 ht ; as well as an e¤ect due to the possibility of using collateral to secure a loan. The value of the second source is proportional to credit tightness t .
In other words, a smaller t reduces the loan size and, as a result, there is a fall in the bene…ts from using a house as a collateral .
Moreover, constraint (2) is always binding, while constraint (3) is binding when
(1 + r t ) > 0:
In a deterministic steady state the credit constraint will be binding if and only if
As we see, either a reduction of the borrowing rate or an increase in in ‡ation can move the economy from the state when the credit constraint is not important to the state when it is binding. In our main presentation we assume the interest rate to be at the zero bound, r t = 0.
In this case, if the price level and the consumption level are stable, inequality (7) is satis…ed.
Following Iacoviello (2005), we will consider that the uncertainty is "small enough" to preserve inequality (7).
Using the particular functional form of utility (1), the assumption of the zero interest rate, and normalizing the units of housing, h t = 1, we transform equation (6) into the following form
where q t is relative housing expenditure, which is de…ned as
Finally, the …rst-order condition with respect to L t de…nes labor supply
Final good producers
We assume that …nal goods are imperfect substitutes and that consumption is de…ned over the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) basket of goods,
The average price-level, P t , is known to be
where p t (i) is the nominal price of the …nal good produced in industry i and Y t denotes aggregate demand. Each good is produced according to a linear technology using labor as the only input,
There is an economy-wide labor market so that all …rms pay the same wage for the same labor, w t (i) = w t ; 8i: All households provide the same share of labor to all …rms, so that the total labor supply in (1) is de…ned as
; which in combination with the production function and demand relates output to labor income.
where t is the measure of price dispersion:
; is
Price-setting of a representative …rm
We will model price stickiness according to Calvo (1983) . A …xed proportion of …rms adjusts prices in each period. These …rms choose the nominal price which maximizes their expected pro…t given that they have to charge the same price in k time periods with probability k . The real pro…t can be written as (i) =
where t is a cost-push shock. We assume that …rms are price takers and cannot a¤ect any aggregate variables. Let p 0 t denote the choice of the nominal price by a …rm that is permitted to re-price in period t. Then the …rm's objective is to choose p 0 t to maximize the following sum
The …rst-order condition implies
It is useful to introduce new variables, X t and Z t ; for the discounted expected real revenue and costs of the …rm: We de…ne them as
The price index will evolve according to the following law of motion,
The government' s optimization problem
The policy maker maximizes the household's utility function with the awareness that the supply of houses is constant and normalized to 1, h t = 1,
subject to a set of constraints imposed by private agents'behavior (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) , where a block of three equations (14-16) represents formula (11) in a VAR form and (17) is the law of motion for the measure of price dispersion.
As in Midrigan and Philippon (2011), we obtain that, in the steady-state output, Y; does not depend on the credit constraint, : However, the value of will positively a¤ect relative housing expenditure, q = (1 )(1 ) and, therefore, equilibrium real house price Q P = qY: It will also de…ne the broad money multiplier, m =
M +B M
: Since broad money, M t + B t ; equals total expenditure, we can compute the money multiplier from (18)
This positive relation between the money multiplier, m t , the credit constraint, t ; and the relative collateral value, q t , will drive our results.
Negative Credit Shock and ZLB
When a small negative credit shock hits an economy, the monetary authority can easily mitigate it by reducing the interest rate with or without applying direct monetary transfers. Consider a simple case when an economy is initially in an optimal steady state. Suddenly, the Loan to Value ratio, ; declines. If the interest rate rate is positive and the credit shock is relatively small, the government can use conventional interest rate policy only, without providing monetary transfers. Precisely, we formulate it in the following proposition Proposition 1 When interest rate is positive, r t > 1; and the negative credit shock is small, there exists such stabilization policy that
That policy implies the following dynamics for interest rate r t = r t 1 1 1
Proof. See appendix
The exact amount of the interest rate reduction depends on three factors: i) the direct negative e¤ect from the di¤erence in inverse LTV ratio,
In the next section we will show that the monetary authorities can mitigate a negative credit shock with direct monetary expansion, T t > 0. The conventional interest rate policy is easier to implement, however it can be restricted by ZLB condition. The non-conventional policy of QE raises lots of questions about its technical implementation: Which assets the central bank should purchase? How much risk it should put on the central bank balance sheet? how easy will it be to reverse QE in the future? In the opposite situation, when the LTV ratio increases, the direct monetary contraction could raise even more implementation issues. Whether the government should increase the interest rate or sell unconventional assets in this case is an interesting topic for future research.
Linear Quadratic Model
In order to make our work easier, we linearize the constraints of private behavior presented in equations (13-14) 3 . In the appendix, we show that the optimal steady state is achieved under price stability, i.e. 
where C and are the policy maker's preferences towards the output gap and in ‡ation, respectively, b t is the target level of output, which is inversely related to the cost push shock and tip denotes the terms that are independent of the policy maker's choices. Coe¢ cients C , and are all positive and computed in the Appendix.
Private-sector behavior constraints
Linearized versions of equations (14-16) can be combined to form a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (26) . A linearization of equation (17) shows that the relative price dispersion term is of second-order importance and can be ignored. Finally, (18) (19) (20) can be combined into (28) , which 3 See appendix 7.2-7.4.
relates the monetary policy instrument, T t ; to in ‡ation and output. Therefore, as a result of simpli…cation and linearization, we obtain a reduced system of three equations
where variables with hats denote percentage deviations from the steady state, and variables without time subscript denote the steady state values.
Expression (28) is the essence of the paper: whatever is the target for in ‡ation and output dynamics, one cannot neglect the ‡uctuations in relative house value, b q t ; or credit availability, b t . In other words, for given dynamics of b t and b Y t ; monetary policy, b T t ; should be adjusted to the shock in the credit constraint and the change in relative house expenditure (b q t ).
Our objective is to …nd the …rst-order approximation to the optimal policy reaction function.
We will allow two shocks to perturb our economy: a cost-push shock, b t ; and a credit shock, b t . We assume that b t and b t follow two independent AR(1) processes
The linear approximation to optimal policy can be found by maximizing the second-order approximation to social welfare (25) , subject to linear constraints (26)- (28).
Proposition 2 In the absence of the cost-push shock, credit market contraction can be perfectly neutralized. Indeed, the policy maker can achieve perfect price and output stabilization, i.e.
Proof. If b t = 0; output and price stability are not in contradiction with the system of constraints (26)- (28) .
Note that complete price and output stabilization delivers the maximum value of social welfare (25) . Hence, the corresponding policy is optimal and the optimal monetary policy rule in this case follows from equation (28) if in ‡ation and output deviations are set to zero.
As a result, we obtain an example where the credit constraint, b t ; and the collateral price, b q t ; are not directly targeted by the government. However, they are the only arguments in the government's reaction function. This is exactly the case discussed in Svensson (2009) . The social planner does not care about the …nancial sector per se, but since it a¤ects in ‡ation and output volatilities, the policy maker must consider the change in the …nancial environment when it implements its monetary policy.
The optimal monetary policy rule (31) has a straightforward interpretation. Recalling the collateral constraint (3) and taking price and output stability into consideration, it may be written as
where we de…ne k = q 1 q : Coe¢ cient k has an important economic meaning. In the steady state, the collateral constraint (3) implies that qP Y = B; while the cash-in-advance constraint (2) implies that P Y = M + qP Y: Combining those two expressions, the debt to money ratio can be computed
Therefore, k is the marginal e¤ect on loans of a change in the base money. In other words, a 1 dollar expansion of the monetary base will create k dollars of loans: k = dB dM . Equation (32) tells us how much the central bank should expand its monetary base. The expansion should just be su¢ cient to o¤set the reduction in debt capacity.
It is noteworthy that optimal policy in the simple framework without cost-push shocks can be reduced to two equations
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) formulated the necessary conditions for the dynamic linear R.E.
system to have a unique solution. It states that there must be the same number of eigenvalues larger than 1 in modulus as there are forward looking variables. To satisfy this condition, the following relation is necessary and su¢ cient, 1 (1 ) > 1; which is true if and only if < 1:
In case > 1; we will have indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. In practice, to have some justi…cation. For the sake of stability, we calibrate the steady-state value of to be less than 1.
Cost of inactive government
In this section, we will numerically assess the value of monetary policy. For this purpose, we will compare optimal policy generating (39) with a policy that neglects changes in the credit market. Our alternative policy is
If a negative credit shock hits the economy and the government does not provide any monetary response to that shock, b T t = 0; both de ‡ation and a signi…cant fall in GDP would be expected. Impulse response to a negative credit shock, b T t = 0: Figure 1 shows that a 1% drop in the loan to collateral value ratio reduces output by 0:2%:
If our model is reasonably calibrated, a 20% drop in the mortgage LTV ratio will result in a 4% fall in GDP in the absence of quantitative easing. This would be even more damaging for consumer prices. In the absence of monetary transfers, the model economy will experience a 12% de ‡ation.
Credit Shocks and the Money Multiplier
It is well known that the money multiplier fell dramatically after the recent …nancial crisis. . However, as the money multiplier was relatively stable for more than 20 years, it became a concern of second-order importance. Although the model we consider is very simple, it manages to identify two variables which may explain the ‡uctuation in the money multiplier as it is computed in equation (21) . First there is t ; the household's borrowing constraint. If we simply consider mortgage contracts o¤ered before the crisis, the loan to value ratio was up to 110% in the UK. After the crisis, it fell to 90% or by almost 20%.
The second variable, q t , is de…ned as
In a relatively stable economy, where h and Y do not change, the proxy for q will be the real price for collateral. If we refer to the mortgage market, the collateral is houses and the real house price index will be a proxy for q: Therefore, the fall in house prices should reduce the money multiplier. As the money multiplier is signi…cant for the transmission of monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Goodhart, 2009; Abrams, 2011) , its ‡uctuation should de…nitely be taken into account when monetary policy is designed. As house prices and the loan to value ratio a¤ect the money multiplier, they cannot be neglected by the monetary authorities.
As we have previously noted, the money multiplier experienced a signi…cant fall after the last …nancial crisis. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the M2 multiplier in the US and the M4 multiplier in the UK. 
It can be easily seen that the optimal policy rule in the absence of a cost-push shock (31) implies that optimal transfers should be equal to the negative of the change in the money multiplier
Therefore, Figure 3 shows that optimal policy entails large expansion immediately after the reduction in LTV and then a gradual contraction in all subsequent periods.
Credit shock and house prices
It is very intuitive that the relative price of collateral should react to the worsening in the loan to value ratio. The value of collateral in our model has two components. The …rst comes directly from the utility function (such as housing, for example). The second is indirect and associated with the use of collateral for borrowing purposes. The larger is LTV t , the larger is the indirect component of the collateral value and therefore, the higher is the price of collateral.
Formally, this can be observed from equation (6) . This is why the negative shock to t should result in falling house prices.
Lower prices for collateral, in turn, further reduce the amount of available credit. As a consequence, households have less money to …nance their consumption and purchase additional housing units. Figure 4 shows how house prices react to the tightening of the households' borrowing constraint in two di¤erent cases. The …rst case is when the government implements the optimal policy rule. The second case is when it keeps the monetary base constant, b T t = 0.
When a negative credit market shock hits the economy, house prices decline in both cases, but optimal policy helps reduce the fall by approximately 20%. 
Optimal policy with cost-push shock
Now we will consider an economy with a cost-push shock. The optimal policy in this case generates the same dynamics for the output gap and in ‡ation as the basic New Keynesian model and is presented in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Optimal policy implies the following in ‡ation dynamics
Proof. Provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that optimal in ‡ation dynamics (39) should be the same as in the basic new Keynesian model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), which does not feature any credit constraint. However, to achieve these dynamics, the monetary policy has to react to the change in the credit conditions
3.5.1 Cost-push shock, house prices and in ‡ation
As expected, the optimal policy stabilises in ‡ation. However it would be interesting to see how the cost-push shock will a¤ect house prices and relative housing expenditure. When the loan to value ratio is constant and only cost-push shocks hit the economy, there is a trade o¤ between in ‡ation and house price stability. The policy of inaction, b Proof. Provided in the Appendix. Figure 5 shows that in the absence of credit shocks, the stabilization of house prices will result in a higher volatility of CPI in ‡ation. This result is consistent with the …ndings of
Iacoviello (2005).
It is interesting to see that the money multiplier, which is proportional to relative housing expenditure, increases with the cost push shock, when optimal policy is implemented. However, house prices decline in this case, but to a smaller extent than the corresponding decline in output. 
Loan to value ratio
We have shown that the government ought to include the loan to value ratio (q t ) in its policy rule because it delivers the highest welfare measure. In that discussion, we considered t to be exogenously given. Perhaps one of the most important questions is to identify the factors which explain the ‡uctuation in t :
Endogenising the loan to value ratio can have a number of very important policy implications, for example if the LTV ratio equals the e¤ective recovery rate of mortgages, so that direct lending to households compromises the balance sheet of the central bank. In that case, Help to Buy and Start Up loans will result in budget losses and a Funding for Loans scheme could in this case result in yet more non-performing loans on the central bank's balance. We are not aware of any model which can assess these consequences. 4 Although the recovery rate is highly correlated with default risk (Mora, 2012) , there are some other explanatory factors which can be in ‡uenced by the government.
Expected collateral in ‡ation
One of the explanatory variables of changes in LTV may be expected house price in ‡ation (Q t ) as in Iacoviello (2005) . This can easily be modelled by substitution of (29) .
where < 1; and u t is a persistent shock unrelated to expected changes in house prices.
Shocks u t can in this case be regarded as a shock to expected future house prices which is another factor for consideration for the monetary authorities. In some cases, shocks to expectations do not re ‡ect the changes in fundamentals. The central bank will not compromise its balance sheet by buying collateral and keep it for a longer time period until the negative shock dies out.
In this modi…ed model, we received a very similar impulse response function to the unexpected change in u t and still we found that an optimal policy can completely stabilize output and in ‡ation when the credit shock a¤ects the economy. Similarly, in response to cost-plush shocks, policy b T t = 0 stabilizes house prices but causes a positive and relatively large response of the consumer price in ‡ation.
Liquidity, transaction costs and the value of collateral
An increase in the collateral value is an e¤ective way to raise the money multiplier However, collateral securitization could also add to risk and even generate additional moral hazard problems (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008) . In this context, the Freddie Mac arrangements were safer than the new measures proposed in the UK. The mortgages that were eligible for securitization with Freddie Mac usually required a 20% downpayment, while the Funding for Lending Scheme does not specify the quality of the loans that can be used in the scheme (Bank of England, 2012) . British "Help to Buy" may be even riskier, such that the government will "loan up to 20% of the value of your new build home and "mortgage guarantee" where lenders will be incentivised to make more mortgages available for people with small deposits."
(HM Treasury, 2013). It could mean that the government intends to provide for the risk margin charged by the lender as an insurance against construction risks.
Apart from the expected value of collateral, the loan to value ratio should depend on the recovery rate for non-performing loans. The recovery rate negatively depends on the transaction costs associated with selling the repossessed assets. Any taxes collected during that process would negatively contribute to LTV. One straightforward recommendation can be to abolish stamp duties for repossessed properties.
The other way of increasing the value of collateral is to encourage the construction and consumption of housing. According to Frame and White (2005) , the US government uses a tax deduction of the mortgage interest and accelerated depreciation on rental housing for that purpose.
Preference for Money
Michael Woodford (2012) has suggeted that the assumption about perfect substitutability between …nancial instruments could exclude from the model some very important economic realities. One way to make money and loans imperfectly substitutable is to model real money as a part of the preference function 5 . The intuition is standard: people may prefer to hold money as it is a liquid asset that can be used for certain transactions where it may be di¢ cult to use credit; i.e. rent payment or home repairs (See Telyukova and Wright, 2008) . This would justify an additional positive value of cash money compared to credit. However, there are other occasions when money may be less desired. For example, in electronic transactions, especially when payment is made to an unknown supplier, credit cards are safer to use than debit cards 6 . This is just one example to demonstrate that as …nancial market develops the preference for cash may decline.
To capture imperfect substitutability between cash and credit, we modify household prefer-ence (1) in the following way
where parameter re ‡ects the preference of using money. As before, the household maximises its utility subject to constraints (2, 3 and 5). The …rst order conditions will be slightly di¤erent.
Labour supply
First, the labour supply equation (9) of the main model will become (43)
where U 0 m is the marginal utility from real money. That can not be derived from a conventional money in utility model without credit constraint 7 , where labour supply equation (9) is usual.
The di¤erence is that in our model households can not borrow cash. The household can only increase money holding by supplying more labour. As money is used for consumption, it gives double bene…ts: through utility from consuming good and through pleasure from possessing money. Therefore, households supply more labour when they have a greater preference for cash 8 .
Credit constraint
It is even more interesting see how the condition when the credit constraint is binding will change. Equation (7) is becomes 
Consider the case when r is su¢ ciently small, 1 (1+r) > 0: Then, as we noticed above,
inequality (45) is satis…ed if U 0 m = 0. As U 0 m increases, the constraint may became non-binding. We can compute a threshold such that if preferences towards money grow stronger than that value, the credit constraint becomes non-binding.
Proposition 5
If the real interest rate is smaller than the inverse discount factor, (1+r) < 1 ;
There exists a value ; such that inequality (45) is satis…ed for preferences as in (42), when 0 < ; where
Proof. See appendix.
In Proposition 5 we de…ne the value of parameters under which the credit constraint is binding in steady state. The larger is the higher is the probability that the constraint is binding. From formula (46) we directly obtain Corollary 6.
Corollary 6
increases with i) in ‡ation, ; and declines with ii) nominal interest rate, r; iii) real interest rate, (1+r) ; iv) household patience,
; v) Loan to value ratio, ; vi) intristic value of housing, :
Corollary 6 helps to understand the evolution of the importance of the credit constraint over time. It could have been that the LTV ratio were not so important in the past because the real interest rate was high and thus was low. At the same time, the …nancial market was less developed and borrowing practice was less socially acceptable, hence was high. Perhaps, it was a time when was larger than and the borrowing constraint was non-binding. As a consequence the loan to value ratio was not so important. According to Peñaloza and Barnhart (2011) the culture of debt/credit payment became more acceptable overtime and, with further development of the …nancial market, hence might have fallen below making the LTV ratio so vital.
Conclusion
We have shown that in contrast to some other …ndings presented in the literature, such as
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) behavioral constraints. A lower households'borrowing rate reduces demand and, as a result, causes de ‡ation. We have shown that an exogenous decrease in the loan to value ratio can be o¤set by expansionary monetary policy in such a way that credit tightening will neither a¤ect output nor the consumer price in ‡ation.
We connected our results to the money multiplier which is the most important variable in propagation of monetary policy, as discussed in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and recently in Abrams (2011) . Indeed, it is very intuitive that the expansion of the monetary base should be larger when the money multiplier falls. And since the multiplier depends on the loan to value ratio and real house prices, optimal monetary policy should react to their ‡uctuations. Finally, we have shown that optimal policy generates a large and persistent fall in the money multiplier in response to credit shocks.
Although our model is helpful in providing some justi…cation for quantitative easing and explaining the fall in the money multiplier, there are a number of important extensions that should be addressed. First, the volatility of the loan to value ratio requires an economic explanation. This would allow for a better assessment of a number of currently proposed or adopted policy measures. Second, the assets of the central bank are not modelled directly and, therefore, it is impossible to see how the risk taken on the central bank balance sheet will a¤ect the economy. If assets are risky, the central bank will face di¢ culties when it decides to implement a monetary contraction.
Finally, the money multiplier per se does not generate any value in our model, and the steady-state output value does not depend on any …nancial variables. This is not the case according to King and Levine (1993) and Freeman and Kydland (2000) who found that total borrowing by the non-…nancial sector has a positive e¤ect on economic growth.
Appendix

First-order conditions for household optimization
The household maximises the expected discounted sum of future utility (1) subject to constraints (2, 3, 5) . The corresponding Lagrangian is:
where it are Lagrange multipliers. The …rst-order conditions with respect to consumption (C t ), housing quantity (h t ), debt (B t ) and money (M t+1 ) are:
First we use (47) and (49) to claim that constraints (2) and (5) are binding and for computing
Lagrange multipliers 1t and 3t : That and (51) immediately give
as the labour supply equation. Furthermore, equation (50) becomes
We need to check if 2t is strictly positive. Consider a deterministic steady state with price stability and zero interest rate. In this case,
That is exactly the steady state that we will investigate; assuming that the shocks are not too large, the Lagrange multiplier should be positive and therefore constraint (3) should be binding.
Finally, combining (48) and (50) we get
This is the same as (6) in the main text.
Optimal steady state
Following Benigno and Woodford (2012), we will …nd the best steady state for the optimal commitment policy from a timeless perspective. The policy maker will maximize household utility (12) subject to constraints (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) . It is easy to see that constraints (13) and (18) (19) (20) are only used to de…ne q t , M t ; P t and T t . Therefore, we write a Lagrangian to reduced model (14) (15) (16) (17) .
We start with the log linear approximation to constraints (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) around the optimal steady state. As shown in Benigno and Woodford (2005) , constraint (17) implies that b t = b t 1 +O2;
and the log deviation of the relative price dispersion is of second-order importance when price stability is optimal. Therefore, the log linearisation of (13) (14) (15) (16) gives (64-67). In turn, (65-67) can be combined into one equation which represents the Phillips Curve. First, combine equations (66) and (67):
We subtract expression (65) and simplify to obtain the New Keynesian Phillips curve
Second-order approximation
Applying the Benigno and Woodford (2012) algorithm, we will get the social welfare function which consists of the sum of squares of the output and in ‡ation gaps. In particular, Benigno and as a sum of pure second-order terms.
where F i is the dynamic constraint imposed by household behavior and i is the value of the corresponding Lagrange multiplier in steady state. Furthermore, S( ) is a functional de…ned on twice di¤erentiable functions of multiple arguments F (X t ), X t = [X 1t ; :::X nt ] as follows
where b X kt is the log deviation of variable X kt from its steady-state value X k : To implement that algorithm, we need to apply functional S to constraints (14) (15) (16) (17) since all other constraints are not binding and the corresponding Lagrange multipliers have zero values in the optimal steady
Using steady-state values (63), we can compute the welfare approximation to (74)
First, we simplify S 3 : We will use (67) to substitute for the b t+1 b Z t+1 term:
where the parameters are de…ned as follows
(1 a) (1 ) (v + 1) :
Solution to social planner LQ problem
The social planner maximises (86) subject to constraint (73) only, since all other constraints are non-binding,
The …rst-order conditions imply the optimal in ‡ation dynamics 
Proof of Proposition 1
In this appendix we will show that a moderate fall in the LTV ratio can be neutralised by lowering the interest rate and without quantitative easing. Consider model (13)- (20) and a policy which aims to achieve a complete stabilization of the credit shock by the means of interest rate. That is T t = T t+1 = 0, t = t+1 = 1; Y t+1 = Y t = Y t 1 . That implies constant velocity of cash and from (18) it follows that product t q t is also constant.
t+1 q t+1 = t q t = t 1 q t 1 = A;
To compute the interest rate dynamics for stabilising policy we will combine (13) Proof. Consider dynamics (27) - (28) with b T t = 0; b t = 0:
Plugging Equation (92) with one lead into (91), we would get that the dynamic for relative house expenditure does not depend on a shock or any other variable in the system.
which implies complete stability, b q t = 0: Moreover, by de…nition, Q t = q t P t Y t in ‡ation of house prices is
Combining it with (92) and b q t = 0; we get zero house price in ‡ation in every period.
Money in the Utility Function
The Lagrangian to the household problem when there is a preference over the means of payment is giving by: where it are Lagrange multipliers. The …rst-order conditions with respect to consumption (C t ), housing quantity (h t ), debt B t and money (M t+1 ) are: (1 + r t ) 3t+1 = 0; (96)
It changes the labor supply equation which in steady state is the same as (99)
Recall that if the constraint is binding, then 
